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SLAPPing Back in Federal Court: 
Florida’s anti-SLAPP Statute 
HARRIS BLUM* 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or 
“SLAPPs,” are frivolous lawsuits used to silence and harass 
critics by forcing them to spend money on legal fees. An 
overwhelming majority of states have enacted anti-SLAPP 
statutes to shield against these lawsuits, recognizing their 
potential to chill free speech and healthy debate. Though 
anti-SLAPP statutes come in different shapes and sizes, they 
commonly employ procedural mechanisms such as expe-
dited dismissal procedures, heightened standards at the 
pleading and summary judgment stages, and fee-shifting 
provisions. The unintended consequence of these features is 
that SLAPP filers can often elude the protections of anti-
SLAPP statutes by filing suit in federal court, where Federal 
Rules of Procedure displace conflicting state law. Unlike 
other states’ anti-SLAPP statutes, however, Florida’s ver-
sion—when read properly—does not conflict with the Fed-
eral Rules of Procedure. 
  
 
 *  J.D. Candidate 2022, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2017, Uni-
versity of Maryland. Many thanks to my incredible colleagues on the University 
of Miami Law Review for their insightful edits and comments and Professors Ser-
gio Campos and Madeleine Plasencia for their critical guidance and feedback. I 
would also like to thank my family and friends, for this Note would not have been 
possible without their unwavering support. 
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At the tail end of the 1980s, two University of Denver professors 
noticed a “disturbing” trend—some citizens were using lawsuits to 
prevent others from or punish others for speaking out.1 The profes-
sors called those suits “SLAPPs,” short for Strategic Lawsuits 
 
 1 George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation” (“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 
U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 938 (1992); see also Penelope Canan et al., Using 
Law Ideologically: The Conflict Between Economic and Political Liberty, 8 J.L. 
& POLS. 539, 539–40 (1992). 
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Against Public Participation.2 A lawsuit, the Supreme Court has 
said, can be “a powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation” be-
cause, no matter how frivolous the suit is, the defendant must retain 
counsel and “incur substantial legal fees to defend against it.”3 The 
suit’s ultimate consequence is its “chilling effect” on the defendant’s 
willingness to continue the activity that gave rise to that suit.4 
Though SLAPPs come in many flavors—libel, zoning, and tortious 
interference, for example—they all arise from the target’s5 protected 
First Amendment activity.6 
In response to this trend, many states enacted anti-SLAPP stat-
utes.7 For the most part, these statutes combat SLAPPs by (1) giving 
targets the ability to file motions to dismiss or strike early in the 
litigation process; (2) obliging courts to hear these motions quickly 
and staying discovery in the meantime; (3) requiring the filer to 
show that their case has merit; and/or (4) imposing cost-shifting 
sanctions that award fees and costs if the filer cannot meet that bur-
den.8 At the same time, these mechanisms can make federal 
courts—where Federal Rules of Procedure displace conflicting state 
laws9—a safe harbor for SLAPP filers.10 Most Courts of Appeals 
hold that various iterations of the anti-SLAPP statute conflict with 
 
 2 Pring & Canan, supra note 1, at 939. 
 3 Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740–41 (1983). 
 4 Id. at 741. 
 5 SLAPP parties are best described in terms of “filers” and “targets,” rather 
than plaintiffs and defendants. See Pring & Canan, supra note 1, at 942 n.11.This 
is because SLAPPs arise in many contexts, including counterclaims, in which case 
the “target” is really the plaintiff. Id. 
 6 Id. at 946–47. 
 7  See State Anti-SLAPP Laws Reference Chart, PUB. PARTICIPATION 
PROJECT, https://anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection (last visited 
Sept. 17, 2021) (listing states that currently have anti-SLAPP statutes and rating 
the protections of each). 
 8 Issues Memorandum from Lane Shetterly, Chair, Robert T. Sherwin, Rep. 
& Pub. Participation Prot. Act Drafting Comm. to the Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on 
Unif. State L. 3 (June 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/7LCX-WNB9 [hereinafter Mem-
orandum from Shetterly]. 
 9 See infra Section I.A. 
 10 See infra Section II.B. 
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the Federal Rules of Procedure and therefore do not apply in a fed-
eral court.11 
Florida first enacted an anti-SLAPP statute in 2000,12 but that 
law applied only to suits filed by state actors.13 Because of its nar-
row scope, the statute saw little action during its effective period.14 
All that changed in 2015 when Florida amended its anti-SLAPP stat-
ute to include suits brought by a “person.”15 Although Florida’s stat-
ute lacks many of the procedural mechanisms found in other states’ 
statutes,16 the law still contains a handy tool for combatting 
SLAPPs17: a fee-shifting provision that entitles SLAPP targets to 
attorney’s fees and costs when a filer’s suit violates the statute.18 
 
 11 See Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., LLC., 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (D.C.); La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2020) (California); 
Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir. 2019) (Texas); Carbone v. Cable 
News Network, 910 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2018) (Georgia); see also infra 
Part II. 
 12 Citizen Participation in Government Act, 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2000-
174 (West) (formerly codified at Fla. Stat. § 768.295). 
 13 Id. (“No governmental entity in this state shall file or cause to be 
filed . . . .”). 
 14 Samuel J. Morley, Florida’s Expanded Anti-SLAPP Law: More Protection 
for Targeted Speakers, 90 FLA. B.J. 17, 18 (2016) (suggesting that government 
entities “‘hardly, if ever,’” filed SLAPP suits). 
 15 See 2015 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2015-70 (West) (codified as Fla. Stat. § 
768.295). 
 16 See Morley, supra note 14, at 18 (“Unlike many states, Florida’s version 
does not contain any special burden shifting, burden of proof, motion to strike, or 
discovery provisions to help flesh out the details of SLAPP dismissals.”).  
 17 See, e.g., David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The 
Problem and Possible Solution, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207, 1212 (1995) (arguing 
that fee shifting is a “possible solution” for the “chilling effect” of litigation ex-
penses on media defendants in frivolous suits); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal 
Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662–
63 (1982) (positing that fee-shifting is “sound” when socially desirable litigation 
would otherwise be uneconomical for a prospective party); Robert V. Percival & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest Litigation, 
47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 241 (1984) (“Fee shifting is designed to remove 
some of the disincentives facing public interest litigants, thus increasing access to 
the courts for groups who otherwise might be unrepresented or underrepre-
sented.”). 
 18 See FLA. STAT. ANN. 768.295(4) (West 2015) (“The court shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with a 
claim that an action was filed in violation of this section.”). That said, victories 
for SLAPP targets under Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute are hard to come by. See 
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And that matters. David Boies presents evidence that more than 
ninety percent of all litigation expenses for defamation suits go to 
legal fees and related expenses.19 Similarly, Florida’s Office of the 
Attorney General reviewed twenty-one SLAPPs filed in Florida be-
tween 1983 and 1993 and found that the costs of defending some of 
those suits surpassed six figures.20 While larger media corporations 
might be able to afford such a bill, most SLAPPs target middle-class 
Americans, many of whom are first-time activists.21 
This Note seeks to establish that, when given its proper meaning, 
Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute does not conflict with the Federal 
Rules of Procedure. Part I, therefore, outlines the framework for ad-
dressing putative conflicts between Federal Rules of Procedure and 
state laws. Part II then discusses the different approaches that the 
courts of appeals have taken when applying that framework to puta-
tive conflicts between Federal Rules and certain states’ anti-SLAPP 
statutes. Because such conflicts turn on a construction of the Federal 
Rules and the relevant state’s statute, Part III attempts to give Flor-
ida’s anti-SLAPP statute its proper meaning. That Part begins by 
discussing the statute’s text before discussing the case law that, alt-
hough sparse, has interpreted the law to this point. Finally, Part IV 
concludes by applying the framework for putative conflicts between 
Federal Rules and state laws to the interpretation of Florida’s anti-
SLAPP statute outlined in Part III. And that yields the conclusion 
that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute does not conflict with the Federal 
Rules and therefore applies in federal court. 22 
 
Zach Schlein, Miami Lawyers Win Rare Victory in Anti-SLAPP Case, LAW.COM 
(Oct. 23, 2018, 1:51 PM), https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2018/10/23
/miami-lawyers-win-rare-victory-in-anti-slapp-case/. 
 19 Boies, supra note 17, at 1207. 
 20 See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., ISSUE BRIEF ON STRATEGIC LAWSUITS 
AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, S. 2009-332, 2008 Sess., at 2 (Fla. 2008) (citing 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH, STRATEGIC 
LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SLAPPS) IN FLORIDA: SURVEY AND 
REPORT 2 (1993)), https://www.flsenate.gov/UserContent/Committees/Publicat
ions/InterimWorkProgram/2009/pdf/2009-332ju.pdf. 
 21 Pring & Canan, supra note 1, at 940. 
 22 The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed an order awarding attorneys’ fees to a 
SLAPP target under Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute. Parekh v. CBS Corp., 820 F. 
App’x 827, 836 (11th Cir. 2020). But the court explicitly declined to address the 
issue analyzed in this Note—that Florida’s anti-SLAPP Statute applies in federal 
court—because the SLAPP filer failed to raise the argument below and thus 
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I. CHOOSING BETWEEN FEDERAL PROCEDURAL LAW AND 
STATE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
As most first-year law students will tell you, federal courts must 
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law when sitting 
in diversity jurisdiction.23 Two federal statutes produce that deceiv-
ingly simple proposition.24 The first, the Rules Enabling Act, em-
powers the Supreme Court to “prescribe general rules of practice 
and procedure” to be used in federal courts provided that such rules 
do not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”25 When 
faced with a Federal Rule of Procedure that seemingly conflicts with 
a state’s “substantive” law, the threshold question is whether the 
Federal Rule is “sufficiently broad” to collide with the state law.26 
If so, the Federal Rule applies unless it is invalid under the Rules 
Enabling Act, which occurs when the Rule abridges, enlarges, or 
modifies a substantive right, or when the Rule cannot be “rationally” 
 
forfeited it on appeal. Id. (citing Tannenbaum v. United States, 142 F.3d 1262, 
1263 (11th Cir. 1998)). But see Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 
1322, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (“Florida’s anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision does 
not conflict with any Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus may apply in a 
federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction.”); Corsi v. Newsmax Media, Inc., 
519 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1128 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (applying Bongino), appeal dock-
eted, No. 21-10480 (11th Cir. Feb. 16, 2021). On appeal, Corsi argues that Flor-
ida’s anti-SLAPP statute conflicts with the Federal Rules, see Appellant’s Initial 
Brief at 16–19, Corsi v. Newsmax Media, Inc., No. 21-10480 (11th Cir. July 28, 
2021), setting the stage for the Eleventh Circuit to decide the question addressed 
in this Note. 
 23 E.g., Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 65, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters 
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied 
in any case is the law of the State.”); Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) 
(“[F]ederal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.”). 
 24 See 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE DESKBOOK § 57 (2d ed. 2019), Westlaw FPP DESKBOOK (“No 
issue in the whole field of federal jurisprudence has been more difficult than de-
termining the meaning of [the Rules of Decision Act].”). Adding insult to injury, 
at least one judge has complained of a “headache” when discussing the Supreme 
Court’s most recent decision in this area. Oral Argument at 9:08, Abbas v. Foreign 
Pol’y Grp., 783 F.3d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 13-7171), 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/record-
ings2015.nsf/363F50B1AF33E8BC85257D770055EC2E/$file/13-7171.mp3. 
 25 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
 26 See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987) (quoting 
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50, 750 n.9 (1980)). 
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classified as procedural. 27 If the Federal Rule and state law do not 
conflict—or if they do conflict, but the Federal Rule is invalid—the 
second statute, the Rules of Decision Act, 28 steps in and adjures fed-
eral courts to apply state law.29 Therefore, the crux of the issue in 
most cases is whether a Federal Rule and a state law conflict.30 
A. Determining Whether a Federal Rule and a State Law 
Conflict 
Because the Supreme Court has employed an array of methods 
to interpret competing Federal Rules and state laws, the approach 
for analyzing potential conflicts between Federal Rules and state 
laws is less than clear.31 The Court’s most recent decision on this 
 
 27 Id. at 5 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472). The Supreme Court has yet to 
render a Federal Rule invalid under the Rules Enabling Act. See Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) (plurality 
opinion). Indeed, the requirement that the Supreme Court report the Rule to Con-
gress for a period of review before the Rule takes effect, 28 U.S.C. § 2074, in 
tandem with the Advisory Committee’s, Judicial Conference’s, and Supreme 
Court’s study and approval of each Federal Rule of Procedure cloaks those Rules 
with a presumption of validity. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 6. 
 28 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (corresponds to the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 
1 Stat. 73, 92). 
 29 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 65, 71, 78 (1938). 
 30 See Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal 
Rules: An Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 
707, 737 (2006) (“That leaves conflicts between the Federal Rules and state law 
as the principal arena in which controversies persist under the Erie doctrine.”); 
Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Starting Points: The Potential of Default Rules in Structuring 
Choice of Law Analysis, 10 J.L. ECON & POL’Y 125, 146–47 (2013) (“The scope 
of a federal rule is often the central disputed issue in Erie cases . . . .”). 
 31 See Joshua P. Zoffer, Note, An Avoidance Canon for Erie: Using Federal-
ism to Resolve Shady Grove’s Conflicts Analysis Problem, 128 YALE L.J. 482, 
492–93 (2018) (documenting seventy years of “confusing and contradictory ap-
proaches to conflicts analysis” that “eventually culminated in Shady Grove’s three 
conflicting tests.”). Compare Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 
427 n.7 (1996) (citing Walker, 446 U.S. at 750–52) (“Federal courts have inter-
preted the Federal Rules . . . with sensitivity to important state interests and regu-
latory policies.”), and id. at 437 n.22 (ceding that Rule 59 provides a vehicle for 
challenging excessiveness of jury’s verdict, but arguing that state law supplies the 
answer to whether damages are excessive), with id. at 468 & n.12 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (agreeing that state law supplies an answer to whether damages are ex-
cessive, but arguing that Rule 59 supplies the vehicle for challenging excessive-
ness of jury’s verdict). 
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point is Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co., 32 which contains three opinions, each embodying a differ-
ent interpretive approach to competing Federal Rules and state 
laws.33 
Shady Grove arose after a class of plaintiffs sued Allstate in fed-
eral court to recover statutory interest after Allstate failed to make 
timely payments on insurance claims.34 At issue was a potential con-
flict between a New York statute,35 which precludes class actions in 
lawsuits that seek penalties such as statutory interest, and Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23,36 which permits a class action as long 
as certain conditions are satisfied.37 In other words, the New York 
law precludes a class action when Rule 23 would otherwise permit 
one. For that reason, five justices agreed that the two conflicted and 
that Rule 23 displaced New York’s law.38 More important than that 
holding, however, are the competing interpretive approaches em-
ployed by the three opinions.39 
 
 32 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
 33 See Ralph U. Whitten, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. All-
state Insurance Co.: Justice Whitten, Nagging in Part and Declaring a Pox on All 
Houses, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 115, 125 (2010) (“Combined with its failure to 
establish an appropriate and consistent method for interpreting Federal Rules to 
determine whether they conflict with state law, the Court leaves the fundamental, 
threshold question under the Erie doctrine in a state of incoherence. The result has 
and will continue to be chaos in the lower federal courts . . . .”). 
 34 559 U.S. at 397. 
 35 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 901(b) (McKinney 2006) (“Unless a stat-
ute . . . specifically authorizes the recovery [of a penalty or statutory damages] in 
a class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery 
created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 36 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue . . . 
if: [four conditions are met].”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (emphasis added) (providing 
that a class action “may be maintained” if Rule 23(a) is satisfied). 
 37 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 396. 
 38 Id. at 411; see also id. at 416, 429–31 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing 
that Rule 23 displaces New York’s law). 
 39 The opinion also embodies three distinct approaches to testing the validity 
of a Federal Rule under the Rules Enabling Act. See generally Stephen B. Bur-
bank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady 
Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 25–52 (2010); Zoffer, supra note 31, at 499–503. 
Because this Note posits that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute does not collide with 
any Federal Rule, that analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. 
2021] SLAPPING BACK IN FEDERAL COURT 353 
 
Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice Scalia employed a 
rigid, textualist approach, concluding that the New York “statute’s 
clear text” prohibited a class action when Rule 23 permitted one.40 
He therefore brushed aside the argument that Federal Rules should 
be read with “sensitivity to important state interests” to avoid con-
flicts with a state law.41 Though Justice Scalia admitted that an am-
biguous Federal Rule should be read to avoid “substantial varia-
tions” in outcomes between state and federal litigation,42 he con-
cluded that a Federal Rule’s text could not be contorted under any 
circumstance.43 
In a dissent that also garnered four votes, Justice Ginsburg em-
phasized the Court’s long history of “vigilantly” reading the Federal 
Rules to avoid a conflict with state laws.44 Unlike Justice Scalia, she 
focused on the purposes underlying Rule 23 and New York’s law, 
positing that while “[t]he fair and efficient conduct of class litiga-
tion” is the concern of Rule 23, the “remedy for an infraction of state 
law . . . is the legitimate concern of the State’s lawmakers and not 
of the federal rulemakers.”45 In other words, Justice Ginsburg read 
New York’s law to place a “limitation” on the kinds of remedies 
available to class action plaintiffs.46 Because Rule 23 “does not 
command that a particular remedy be available” for a class, she 
thought the conflict was avoidable.47 In essence, the task as she saw 
it was to approach putative conflicts with greater deference to im-
portant state policies.48 
That leaves Justice Stevens’ concurrence as the swing vote. Like 
the dissent, Justice Stevens embraced the principle that courts 
should interpret a federal rule with “sensitivity” to important state 
 
 40 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 403, 405–06 (plurality opinion). 
 41 Id. at 405 n.7. 
 42 Id. (quoting Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 
(2001)). 
 43 See id. at 405–06. 
 44 See id. at 439–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 45 Id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
 46 Id. at 444–45. 
 47 Id. at 446 
 48 See id. at 459 (“I would continue to approach Erie questions in a manner 
mindful of the purposes underlying the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules Ena-
bling Act, faithful to precedent, and respectful of important state interests.”). 
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interests and regulatory policies.49 He, too, believed that courts 
should avoid “immoderate interpretations of the Federal Rules that 
would trench” on state policies.50 But he also agreed with Justice 
Scalia, explaining that courts may not “rewrite” the Federal Rules 
under any circumstance.51 In the end, an unavoidable conflict ex-
isted between the two provisions in his mind, leaving the central 
disagreement between him and the dissent about “the degree to 
which the meaning of federal rules may be contorted . . . to accom-
modate state policy goals.”52 
In sum, Justice Scalia’s opinion yields an approach to the con-
flicts analysis that is the least deferential to state laws. For that rea-
son, this Note applies Justice Scalia’s approach to the conflict anal-
ysis below in an effort to show that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute 
steers clear of competing Federal Rules—even under the most strin-
gent analysis. 
B. The Analysis When No Conflict Exists: Erie’s Twin Aims 
When the relevant Federal Rule and state law do not conflict, the 
analysis proceeds to a second step.53 This step finds its roots in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,54 where the Supreme Court retired its 
earlier decision in Swift v. Tyson55 and held that the Rules of Deci-
sion Act requires federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction to 
apply the states’ substantive law.56 The “twin aims” of Erie were (1) 
to avoid the unfairness that arises when the result or character of 
litigation differs simply because the suit had been brought in a fed-
eral court and (2) to discourage the practice of forum-shopping that 
had arisen under Swift. 57 The problem is, the line between substance 
and procedure is often “hazy.”58 The Court grasped that in Guaranty 
 
 49 Id. at 421 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 50 Id. at 430 (quoting id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
 51 Id. at 431. 
 52 Id. at 422 n.5. 
 53 See Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–70 (1965); Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 445 U.S. 740, 752–53 (1980). 
 54 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 55 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 56 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–80. 
 57 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
 58 Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring); see also John Hart Ely, The 
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 735 (1974) (“With York four 
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Trust Co. v. York59 when it sidelined “abstractions regarding ‘sub-
stance and ‘procedure’” in favor of a test that would apply state laws 
if they “significantly affect” the outcome of a suit.60 Applying that 
test, the Court paved the way for a flurry of state laws to operate in 
federal courts.61 
When the overbreadth of York’s outcome-determinative test be-
came apparent, so too did its inevitable reverberation.62 That rever-
beration came in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 
Inc. when the Court confronted a conflict between federal and state 
law about the division of responsibility between judge and jury.63 
After announcing the presence of countervailing federal interests,64 
the Byrd Court framed the question as a balancing test: whether the 
federal policy outweighs the states’ interest in avoiding different 
outcomes in federal and state courts.65 
Finally, in Hanna v. Plummer, 66 the Court explained that its 
prior cases show that choices between state and federal law cannot 
 
years in the future, the Court was still operating on the assumption that the Rules 
of Decision Act divided legal problems into two separate piles market ‘substance’ 
and ‘procedure’ . . . .”). 
 59 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (citation omitted) (“Neither ‘substance’ nor ‘pro-
cedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies different variables depending 
upon the particular problem for which it is used.”). 
 60 Id. at 109. 
 61 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202–04 
(1956) (analyzing a state law governing enforceability of arbitration provisions); 
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555–56 (1949) (analyzing 
a statute requiring derivative plaintiffs to make bond payments for maintenance 
of derivative actions); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 535–38 
(1949) (analyzing a statute affecting which corporations may bring state law 
claims); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532–34 
(1949) (analyzing a statute governing tolling for purposes of statute of limita-
tions). 
 62 Ely, supra note 58, at 709. Once it became clear that York’s test controlled 
not only judge-made rules, but also “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and even 
other federal statutes as well, some sort of backlash was inevitable.” Id. 
 63 356 U.S. 525, 534 (1958). The Seventh Amendment is one of the few Bill 
of Rights that does not apply in state courts. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010) (incorporation doctrine). 
 64 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537. 
 65 Id. at 538. 
 66 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
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be made by any axiomatic criterion.67 Rather, those choices turn on 
the two policies underlying Erie: discouraging forum shopping and 
avoiding unfairness. 68 And when those two policies favor applying 
the state law—such that the failure to apply the state law would trig-
ger unfairness or forum shopping—the state law will apply absent 
the presence of some countervailing federal interest.69 
II. THE FATE OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEALS 
Shady Grove’s failure to deliver a single approach for analyzing 
putative conflicts has led to disparate results in the lower courts.70 
Some courts turn to Justice Scalia’s approach71 while others look to 
Justice Stevens’s, interpreting the Federal Rules with sensitivity to 
“important state interests.”72 With that said, the prevailing view in 
the courts of appeals is now that many versions of the anti-SLAPP 
statute collide with Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56.73 This Part exam-
ines both sides of that split to show how the putative conflict analy-
sis works in the context of anti-SLAPP statutes. 
 
 67 Id. at 467. 
 68 Id. 
 69 The occasions in which a countervailing justification has outweighed the 
policies underlying the Erie rule are few and far between. Even so, the language 
appears in the Court’s decisions, old and new. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 
446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980); Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humans. Inc., 418 U.S. 415, 432 
(1996); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 
439 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 70 See Jack E. Pace III & Rachel J. Feldman, From Shady to Dark: One Year 
Later, Shady Grove’s Meaning Remains Unclear, 25 ANTITRUST 75, 78–80 
(2011) (recapping lower courts’ incongruent approaches when applying Shady 
Grove). 
 71 See 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95 n.7 (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting 
a claim that Justice Stevens’ concurrence governs the analysis for putative con-
flicts). 
 72 In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 756 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675 (E.D. Pa. 
2010) (rejecting Justice Scalia’s approach and quoting Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
for the notion that five justices agreed “that Federal Rules should be read with 
moderation in diversity suits to accommodate important state concerns.”); accord 
McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 733, 747 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (internal 
citations omitted) (finding that Justice Stevens was “the crucial fifth vote” and 
thus adopting his approach to putative conflicts). 
 73 See infra Section II.B. 
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A. Godin v. Schencks (The Minority’s Approach) 
The First Circuit was among the first courts of appeals to address 
a putative conflict in the wake of Shady Grove. In Godin v. 
Schencks, the court held that neither Rule 12(b)(6) nor Rule 56 “an-
swer the same question” as Maine’s anti-SLAPP74 statute.75 In so 
doing, the Godin court reasoned Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute does 
not supplant Rules 12 and 56 as much as it supplements those rules 
in cases arising from a target’s First Amendment activity.76 The 
court then read Rule 12(b)(6) narrowly, suggesting that it merely 
provides a mechanism to test the sufficiency of a complaint.77 But 
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, according to the court, creates a sepa-
rate basis for dismissal if the filer cannot satisfy Maine’s special 
rules for suits arising from First Amendment activities.78 In the same 
way, the First Circuit suggested that Rule 56 merely creates a pro-
cess for parties to secure a pretrial judgment absent disputed mate-
rial facts. 79 By contrast, it read Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute to serve 
“the entirely distinct function” of combating SLAPPs.80 The court 
further explained that Maine’s statute allocates the burden of proof, 
which neither Rule 12 nor Rule 56 do.81 “And it is long settled that 
the allocation of burden of proof is substantive in nature and con-
trolled by state law.”82 Relying on Justice Stevens’s Shady Grove 
 
 74 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012). 
 75 629 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 89. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. The Godin court apparently thought that an inherent feature of Rule 56 
“is that a fact-finder’s evaluation of material factual disputes is not required.” Id. 
This seemingly contradicts the summary judgment standard. See Anderson v. Lib-
erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“summary judgment will not lie if the 
dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”). 
 80 Godin, 629 F.3d at 89. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943)). The court’s re-
liance on Palmer seems inapposite, however. Although Palmer indeed holds that 
state law allocates the burden of proving contributory negligence, that holding 
applies only to the burden of proof at trial. 318 U.S. at 117. In fact, the losing 
party argued that Rule 8(c), which makes contributory negligence an affirmative 
defense, allocated the burden of proof at trial. Id. Rejecting this argument, the 
Court explained that “Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of pleading.” Id. The 
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concurrence, the First Circuit concluded that Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 
could not displace Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute because the latter ef-
fectively defines the scope of the state-created right.83 
Perhaps the most vulnerable part of the First Circuit’s analysis 
pertains to the putative conflict between Maine’s discovery-staying 
mechanism and Rule 56.84 For starters, the court assumed that Rule 
56 provides a mechanism for litigants to circumvent a fact-finder’s 
evaluation of factual disputes.85 Rule 56 does just that, to be sure.86 
It does so, however, only after a litigant supports their summary 
judgment motion by citing an evidentiary record, including deposi-
tions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits, dec-
larations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.87 
The development of a “record” is thus implicit in Rule 56’s mecha-
nism for bypassing a fact-finder’s evaluation of the facts. Yet 
Maine’s statute automatically stays discovery upon the filing of a 
special motion,88 thus impeding the development of a record. 
 
Court later referenced that part of the Palmer opinion as an example of a case 
when the “scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party 
urged . . . .” Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965). By negative implica-
tion, Rule 8 is broad enough to control the allocation of the burden at the pleading 
stage. 
 83 Godin, 629 F.3d at 89. 
 84 See Zoffer, supra note 31, at 541 (suggesting it is “implausible to arrive at 
any reading that allows discovery-staying provisions” to operate concomitantly 
with Rule 56). One might also plausibly argue that the First Circuit’s reading of 
Rule 12(b)(6)—that it leaves room for a supplemental state device—is unpersua-
sive. Rule 12(d) does indeed provide that a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 when the court con-
siders matters outside the pleadings. So, the Rules contemplate that a claim will 
be assessed on the pleadings alone or under the summary judgment standard, leav-
ing no room for another device to test the sufficiency of a claim on a pretrial mo-
tion to dismiss. See Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1351 
(11th Cir. 2018) (suggesting that Rules 12 and 56 leave “no room for any other 
device for determining whether a valid claim supported by sufficient evidence to 
avoid pretrial dismissal”); but see Zoffer, supra note 31, at 540 (suggesting that 
“the text of Rule 12 can plausibly be read to create room for the operation” and 
thus application of “anti-SLAPP special motion provisions.”). 
 85 Godin, 629 F.3d at 89; see also supra note 79. 
 86 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). 
 87 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). 
 88 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012). 
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Wary of this, the First Circuit noted that Maine’s law allows a 
court to order “specific discovery” if good cause is shown.89 That 
mechanism, the court said, dovetails with Rule 56(d),90 which grants 
courts latitude to defer a summary judgment motion and order more 
discovery upon the nonmovant’s showing that it cannot present es-
sential facts.91 But this, too, misses the point: Rule 56 provides a 
chance for discovery before a motion for summary judgment,92 
whereas the special motion procedure in Maine’s statute forces the 
nonmovant to justify the need for discovery in the first place.93 
Forging ahead to the second step, the Godin court asked whether 
applying Maine’s statute would best serve the two policies under-
girding Erie.94 Not only does the statute substantively alter a state-
created claim by shifting the burden and forcing the plaintiff to show 
damages, but it also awards attorney’s fees to prevailing SLAPP tar-
gets.95 The court held that declining to apply the statute would pro-
duce an “inequitable administration of justice” between state and 
federal forums along with an incentive for SLAPP filers to forum 
shop.96 
B. The Majority’s Approach 
Most federal courts of appeals to consider this issue have 
shunned the First Circuit’s anemic interpretation of Federal Rules 
12 and 56,97 instead finding an unavoidable conflict exists between 
those Rules and states’ anti-SLAPP statutes.98 This trend began with 
 
 89 Godin, 629 F.3d at 90. 
 90 Id. at 90–91. 
 91 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d). 
 92 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986) (“[sum-
mary judgment need] be refused where the nonmoving party has not had the op-
portunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition.”). Rule 56 is 
quite clear on this point: A party moving for summary judgment “must support 
the assertion by[] citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . .” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
 93 tit. 14, § 556. 
 94 Godin, 629 F.3d at 91. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 92. 
 97 See, e.g., Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1355–56 
(11th Cir. 2018) (“We are not persuaded by the reasoning of [Godin].”). 
 98 To “prevent the collision of California state procedural rules with federal 
procedural rules,” the Ninth Circuit applies the federal standards for dismissal and 
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Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC, when the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia described D.C.’s anti-SLAPP statute99 
as establishing “the circumstances under which a court must dismiss 
a plaintiff’s claim before trial—namely, when the court concludes 
that the plaintiff does not have a likelihood of success on the mer-
its.”100 Federal Rules 12 and 56 answer the same question, how-
ever. 101 And they do so differently.102 As then-Judge Kavanaugh 
explained, the Federal Rules “do not require a plaintiff to show a 
likelihood of success on the merits.”103 Instead, the Rules entitle a 
plaintiff to a trial when they overcome the standards embodied by 
those Rules, both of which differ from and are less difficult than the 
likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits standard.104 In effect, D.C’s 
anti-SLAPP statute sets up another hurdle for a plaintiff to get to 
trial, a feature that “conflicts” with Rules 12 and 56.105 
Even more to the point is the Eleventh Circuit’s explanation that 
Rules 8, 12, and 56 “provide a comprehensive framework governing 
pretrial dismissal and judgment.”106 In Carbone v. Cable News Net-
work, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit declined to apply Georgia’s anti-
SLAPP statute,107 which contains a special motion-to-strike 
 
summary judgment when faced with a California anti-SLAPP motion. See 
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 80 F.3d 890, 
833 (9th Cir. 2018). But the Ninth Circuit declines to apply California’s discov-
ery-staying mechanisms because they collide with Rule 56. See Metabolic Int’l, 
Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2001). But this line of cases is not 
without its critics. See Makeaff v. Trump Univ., LLC 715 F.3d 254, 275 (9th Cir. 
2013) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (urging court to reconsider cases applying Cali-
fornia’s anti-SLAPP statute because “[f]ederal courts have no business applying 
exotic state procedural rules which, of necessity, disrupt the comprehensive 
scheme embodied in the Federal Rules”); Makeaff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 
1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2013) (Waterford, J., dissenting from denial of petition for 
rehearing en banc) (“California’s anti-SLAPP statute impermissibly supplements 
the Federal Rules’ criteria for pre-trial dismissal of an action.”). 
 99 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5501–5505 (West 2012). 
 100 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J.). 
 101 Id. at 1333–34. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 1334–35. 
 105 Id. at 1334.  
 106 Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1351 (11th Cir. 
2018). 
 107 Id. at 1350. 
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procedure that requires the nonmoving party to show there is a 
“probability” that they will prevail on their claim.108 After asking 
whether the Federal Rules in question were broad enough to control 
the disputed issue—the standard under which a pretrial dismissal 
must be tested—the court held that conflict with Rules 8, 12, and 56 
was inevitable.109 
The Fifth Circuit addressed Texas’ anti-SLAPP statute using a 
similar analysis.110 When triggered, the Texas anti-SLAPP statute 
imposes a complex, multi-layered burden-shifting framework.111 
The statute also contains a “clear and specific evidence” standard, 
which a SLAPP filer must meet when a target uses the statute’s spe-
cial motion.112 But, again, those mechanisms collide with the com-
prehensive pretrial framework embodied by Rules 8, 12, and 56.113 
And so those Rules supply the applicable standards and procedures 
for a pretrial motion to dismiss or summary judgment.114 
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit applies Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP 
statute,115 even though that, too, embodies a “probability of success 
on the claim” standard for testing special anti-SLAPP motions.116 
That said, Louisiana courts interpret the “probability of success” 
standard to be “closely in line” with the standard for summary 
 
 108 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (West 2016). 
 109 Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1355. See also supra note 84. 
 110 See generally Klocke v. Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 244–47 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 111 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–27.011 (West 2019). 
If a target triggers that statute with a special motion and establishes that the claim 
relates to his or her First Amendment Activity, id. at § 27.005(b)(1)–(3), the non-
moving party must present “clear and specific evidence” that they can meet each 
element of their claim. Id. at § 27.005(c). Even if the nonmoving party carries that 
burden, a court must strike his or her claim if the moving party (the target) estab-
lishes an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at § 
27.005(d). All the while, the court must stay discovery absent a showing of good 
cause. Id. at §§ 27.003(c), 27.006(b). 
 112 See supra note 111. 
 113 Klocke, 936 F.3d at 245, 247. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164, 181–82 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (before Shady Grove); see also Lozovyy v. Kurtz, 813 F.3d 576, 582–
83 (5th Cir. 2015) (declining to revisit Henry’s analysis of Louisiana’s anti-
SLAPP statute after Shady Grove and assuming the statute does not conflict with 
the Federal Rules); Block v. Tanenhaus, 815 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 2016) (same). 
 116 LA. STAT. ANN. § 971 (2012). 
362 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
 
judgment under Rule 56.117 The conflict between Louisiana’s anti-
SLAPP law and the Federal Rules is therefore “less obvious” than 
that between Texas’ and the Federal Rules.118 
III. FLORIDA’S ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE 
Although multiple district courts have held that Florida’s anti-
SLAPP statute119 applies in federal court,120 neither the Eleventh 
Circuit nor any other circuit has addressed this question.121 The 
overarching theme of this Note is that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute 
does not conflict with any Federal Rules and therefore applies in 
federal court. 122 Hopefully, this analysis of Florida’s anti-SLAPP 
statute is helpful for jurists and practitioners alike. To do so, this 
Part first analyzes the statute’s meaning before turning to the case 
law that, although sparse, has addressed the statute to this point. 
A. The Text 
By its terms, Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute realizes a “fundamen-
tal state policy” by prohibiting lawsuits incompatible with the First 
Amendment right to speak freely on public issues.123 It does so by 
precluding persons and government entities from filing certain suits, 
claims, crossclaims, and counterclaims that undermine public par-
ticipation.124 At the statute’s core is a fee-shifting provision that en-
titles the “prevailing party” to fees and costs when a target claims 
 
 117 See Lozovyy, 813 F.3d at 585–86. 
 118 Klocke, 936 F.4d at 248–49. 
 119 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2015). 
 120 See Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 
2020); Corsi v. Newsmax Media, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (S.D. Fla. 2021) 
(applying Bongino), appeal docketed, No. 21-10480 (11th Cir. Feb. 12, 2021). 
But see Appellant’s Initial Brief at 16–19, Corsi v. Newsmax Media, Inc., No. 21-
10480 (11th Cir. July 28, 2021) (arguing that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute con-
flicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore does not apply in 
federal court). 
 121 See supra note 22. 
 122 See infra Part IV. 
 123 § 768.295(1). 
 124 See § 768.295(3) (“A person or governmental entity in this state may not 
file . . . any . . . claim . . . against another person . . . primarily because such per-
son . . . has exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a 
public issue . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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that a lawsuit violates the statute’s terms.125 Whether a suit in fact 
violates the statute turns on three elements: a filer’s suit must be (1) 
meritless, and (2) primarily caused by (3) the target’s protected 
speech.126 The statute also specifies the procedural mechanisms that 
SLAPP targets can use to trigger the statute’s fee-shifting provi-
sion—a motion to dismiss, a motion for final judgment, and a mo-
tion for summary judgment.127 This Section addresses each aspect 
separately. 
1. THE “FREE SPEECH IN CONNECTION WITH A PUBLIC ISSUE” 
AND “WITHOUT MERIT” REQUIREMENTS 
For the statute to apply, the target’s protected speech must be the 
primary cause of the filer’s claim.128 When analyzing similar lan-
guage found in other states’ anti-SLAPP statutes, courts focus on the 
facts supporting the filer’s theory of liability to see if those facts 
arise from the target’s protected speech.129 So too has the Eleventh 
Circuit employed this approach when interpreting Florida’s anti-
SLAPP statute.130 
The predecessor to Florida’s current statute throws light on the 
nexus required to satisfy the statute’s “primarily because” lan-
guage.131 That version required that the target’s speech be the sole 
cause of the filer’s claim.132 The current version therefore relaxes 
 
 125 § 768.295(4) (“The court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attor-
ney fees and costs incurred in connection with a claim that an action was filed in 
violation of this section.”). 
 126 § 768.295(3). 
 127 § 768.295(4). 
 128 Id. (“A person . . . may not file . . . any lawsuit . . . against another per-
son . . . primarily because such person . . . exercised the constitutional right of 
free speech in connection with a public issue . . . .”(emphasis added)). 
 129 See Morley, supra note 14, at 22. 
 130 Parekh v. CBS Corp., 820 F. App’x 827, 836 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that 
a plaintiff’s defamation suit “arose out of” the defendant’s protected First Amend-
ment Activity, publishing a news report on a matter of public concern in violation 
of Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute (emphasis added)). In that opinion, the Eleventh 
Circuit explicitly declined to address whether Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute ap-
plies in federal court. Id. 
 131 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 256–60 (2012) (“[A] change in the language 
of a prior statute presumably connotes a change in meaning.”). 
 132 See 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 2000-174 (West). 
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the nexus requirement between the filer’s cause of action and the 
target’s protected speech.133 It stands to reason that, in most cases, 
courts can analyze that nexus by looking at the facts that support the 
filer’s theory of liability. 
The statute’s next element is the phrase: “speech in connection 
with a public issue,” which the statute defines to mean any statement 
made (a) before a government entity134 about an issue that a govern-
ment entity is considering or reviewing or (b) in connection with an 
array of multimedia, including plays, movies, television, radio 
broadcasts, audiovisual works, books, magazine articles, musical 
works, and news reports.135 As for the former, speech made before 
a government entity in relation to an issue under consideration or 
review is inherently connected to a public issue.136 The requirement 
that the speech relates to an “issue under consideration or review” 
thus supplants any requirement that the speech be connected to a 
public issue. Similarly, the law does not require that speech relate to 
a public issue when that speech is made in connection with one of 
the listed forms of media.137 This simplifies the matter: when the 
 
 133 See also FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, H.B. 1041, 2015 Sess. (Fla. 2015), 
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2015/1041/Analyses/h1041z1.CJS.PDF 
(“The bill also provides that a meritless suit is a SLAPP suit if brought primarily 
because of the exercise of rights protected by the Act, rather than solely because 
of the exercise of such rights, which is a less rigorous standard than current law.”). 
 134 A government entity refers to the State, including the three branches of 
government, the municipalities, corporations acting as instrumentalities for the 
state and municipalities, and any agencies thereof. FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 768.295(2)(b) (West 2015). 
 135 See id. § 768.295(2)(a). 
 136 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (“Thus we 
consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to 
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government . . . .”). 
 137 Though this proposition follows from the statute’s clear, unambiguous lan-
guage, see § 768.295(2)(a) (defining free speech in connection with public issues 
as “any written or oral statement that is protected under applicable law and is 
made . . . in connection with a play, movie, television program, radio broadcast, 
audiovisual work, book, magazine article, musical work, news report, or other 
similar work”), the legislative history shows that the Legislature was aware of this 
meaning when the bill passed. See COMM. ON RULES, BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 1312, 2015 Sess. (Fla. 2015), https://www.flsenate.gov
/Session/Bill/2015/1312/Analyses/2015s1312.rc.PDF. 
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SLAPP target’s speech takes either form, the speech is per se con-
nected to a public issue within the statute’s plain meaning.138 
Finally, the filer’s suit not only needs to arise from the target’s 
protected speech, it also must be “without merit” to fall within the 
statute’s ambit.139 This is where Florida’s statute departs from the 
pack. Most states’ anti-SLAPP statutes test a suit’s merit using a 
heightened standard, requiring, for example, a SLAPP filer to 
demonstrate that a claim is likely to succeed on the merits140 or es-
tablish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each of 
the claim’s essential elements.141 
Shedding light on Florida’s standard, the Florida Supreme Court 
has used a “without merit” standard to test a complaint’s legal suf-
ficiency on a motion to dismiss, finding that standard was met in 
“the absence of sufficient facts to make a good claim or to state a 
cause of action.”142 In general, if a statute uses words or phrases that 
have already received authoritative construction by that jurisdic-
tion’s court of last resort, those words “are to be understood accord-
ing to that construction.”143 The question, then, is how a SLAPP 
target triggers the statute. 
 
 138 By reducing uncertainty and thus litigation about the types of speech that 
relate to a “public issue,” the statute fulfills its stated intent—for the courts to 
“expeditiously dispose[]” of such suits. See § 768.295(1); see also SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 131, at 217–20 (“A preamble, purpose clause, or recital is a 
permissible indicator of meaning.”). 
 139 See § 768.295(3) (“A person . . . may not file . . . any lawsuit . . . against 
another person . . . without merit and primarily because such person . . . exercised 
the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue . . . .”(em-
phasis added)). 
 140 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502(b) (West 2012). 
 141 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005 (West 2019); see also CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015) (requiring a filer to establish “that there 
is a probability that [they] will prevail on the claim.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-
11.1 (West 2016) (requiring a filer to establish that “there is a probability that 
[they] will prevail on the claim.”). 
 142 See Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 175 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1965) 
(noting that the standards for a motion to dismiss under Florida’s Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are “the same”). 
 143 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 131, at 322. 
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2. THE PROCEDURE FOR INVOKING FLORIDA’S ANTI-SLAPP 
STATUTE 
When the Florida Legislature amended its anti-SLAPP statute in 
2015, it expanded the statute’s coverage to claims brought by private 
persons,144 but left the procedures alluded to in the former version 
untouched.145 Early drafts of the former version included a discov-
ery-staying mechanism, a burden-shifting framework, and a “clear 
and convincing evidence” standard.146 But both chambers of Flor-
ida’s Legislature ultimately expressed concern147 that such proce-
dures would violate the separation of powers provision in the Florida 
Constitution.148 For that reason, the Florida Legislature scrapped 
that version in favor of the one it enacted,149 which lacks any such 
 
 144 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 145 Compare Citizen Participation in Government Act, 2000 Fla. Sess. Law 
Serv. 2000-174 (West), with Fla. Stat. § 768.295. 
 146  See S.B. 308-671-00, 2000 Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2000), http://archive.
flsenate.gov/data/session/2000/Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s0306c1.pdf; H. R. B. 
565-171-00, 2000 Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2000), http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session
/2000/House/bills/billtext/pdf/h0135.pdf. 
 147 See generally STAFF OF SEN. COMM. ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT & 
PRODUCTIVITY, STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 306, 
2000 Leg. Sess., at 3–6 (Fla. 2000), http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/2000/
Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/SB0306.go.pdf; HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 135, 2000 Leg. Sess., at 7–8 (Fla. 2000), 
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2000/135/Analyses/20000135HGG_HB0
135A.GG.pdf; see also S. Res. 306, 2000 Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2000) (enacted as rec-
ommended by Sen. Comm. On Gov’t Oversight & Productivity), http://ar-
chive.flsenate.gov/data/session/2000/Senate/bills/amendments/pdf/sb0306c1455
042.pdf. 
 148 See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“The powers of the state government shall be 
divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to 
one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the branches unless 
expressly provided herein.”); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (empowering Florida’s 
Supreme Court to proclaim rules of practice and procedure). 
 149 See generally STAFF OF SEN. COMM. ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT & 
PRODUCTIVITY, 2000 Leg. Sess., Rep. on CS/SB 306, at 3–6 (Fla. 2000), http://ar-
chive.flsenate.gov/data/session/2000/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/SB0306.go.pdf; S. 
Res. 306, 2000 Leg. Sess. (Fla. 2000) (enacted as recommended by Sen. Comm. 
on Gov’t Oversight & Productivity), http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/
2000/Senate/bills/amendments/pdf/sb0306c1455042.pdf. 
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discovery-staying mechanism, burden-shifting framework, or “clear 
and convincing evidence” standard.150 
Instead, Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute instructs SLAPP targets to 
file a motion for dismissal of the complaint, for final judgment, or 
for summary judgment.151 And if the target succeeds in such a mo-
tion, the statute awards the SLAPP target fees and costs, assuming 
the statute covers the filer’s claim.152 Though the statute is silent 
about the procedures for the motions to dismiss and for final judg-
ment, it expands on a motion for summary judgment: a SLAPP tar-
get “may file a motion for summary judgment, together with sup-
plemental affidavits, seeking a determination that the [filer’s] law-
suit has been brought in violation of this section.”153 The SLAPP 
filer must then file a response with any supplemental affidavits, be-
fore the court “shall” expeditiously set a hearing on the motion.154 
 
 150 See supra note 145; see also Morley, supra note 14, at 18, 23. But see infra, 
pp. 32–33. 
 151 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295(4) (West 2015). (“A person or entity 
sued . . . in violation of this section has a right to an expeditious resolution of a 
claim that the suit is in violation of this section. A person or entity may move the 
court for an order dismissing the action or granting final judgment in favor of that 
person or entity. The person or entity may file a motion for summary judgment, 
together with supplemental affidavits, seeking a determination that the claim-
ant’s . . . lawsuit has been brought in violation of this section . . . .”). 
 152 See id.; see also Parekh v. CBS Corp., 820 F. App’x 827, 836 (11th Cir. 
2020) (holding that statute’s “plain language” supported the district court’s award 
of attorney’s fees and costs to SLAPP target); Boling v. WFTV, LLC, No. 2017-
CA-6488, 2018 WL 2336159, at * 2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 2018) (“Under the anti-
SLAPP law, an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs is mandatory [when 
both elements are met].”). But see Berisha v. Lawson, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1157 
n.8 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (suggesting that SLAPP target entitled only to fees and costs 
incurred in connection with special motion itself). The Berisha court’s reading is 
not without the support of the statute’s language, which entitles the prevailing 
party to fees and costs “incurred in connection with a claim that an action was 
filed in violation of this section.” § 768.295(4) (emphasis added). On the other 
hand, any attorney’s fees and costs incurred to establish that a filer’s claim is 
“without merit,” are also arguably incurred in connection with a claim that the 
filer’s action violated Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute. And that reading is more con-
sonant with the statute’s stated purpose—to protect Floridian’s right to speak 
freely on public issues. See § 768.295(1); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 
131, at 219 (asserting that a statute’s stated purpose suggests “which permissible 
meanings of the enactment should be preferred.”). 
 153 § 768.295(4). 
 154 Id. 
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Save for the requirement that the court expeditiously set a hearing, 
this procedure aligns with that for summary judgment under Flor-
ida’s Rules of Civil Procedure.155 
Viewed this way, Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute creates no pro-
cedural mechanisms; it merely directs SLAPP targets to use the al-
ready-existing procedural mechanisms—a motion to dismiss, a mo-
tion for final judgment, or a motion for summary judgment—to test 
the merits of the filer’s claim.156 If any such motion is successful, 
and if the filer’s claim arises “primarily” because the target engaged 
in one of the two types of activities covered by the statute,157 then 
the target can recoup fees and costs.158 The bottom line is that Flor-
ida’s anti-SLAPP statute is merely a garden variety, fee-shifting pro-
vision that attaches to certain types of claims. 159 But not everyone 
sees it this way. 
B. Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc.—(Mis)Interpreting Florida’s 
Anti-SLAPP Statute 
In Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc., Florida’s Second District Court of 
Appeal became the first Florida appellate court to elaborate on this 
framework.160 At issue in Gundel was the trial court’s refusal to con-
sider supplemental affidavits filed with the SLAPP target’s all-en-
compassing motion to dismiss, motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, and motion for summary judgment.161 Because the statute 
“plainly authorizes” the filing of a motion for summary judgment 
with supplemental affidavits, the appellate court held that the trial 
 
 155 See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(b) (A defending party “may move for a summary 
judgment . . . at any time with or without supporting affidavits.”). 
 156 See § 768.295(4). 
 157 See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text. 
 158 § 768.295(4). 
 159 See Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 
2020) (“At bottom, Florida’s statute is a garden variety fee shifting provision, 
which the Florida legislature enacted to accomplish a ‘fundamental state pol-
icy’—deterring SLAPP suits.”). 
 160 See generally Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc., 264 So. 3d 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2019). But see WPB Residents for Integrity in Gov’t, Inc. v. Materio 284 
So. 3d 555, 556 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (splitting with Florida’s Second District 
Court of Appeal on finality of an order denying an anti-SLAPP motion to dis-
miss). 
 161 Gundel, 264 So. 3d at 309. 
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court should have tested the motion as one for summary judg-
ment.162 The appellate court turned to Florida Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 1.510 to define the contours of the summary judgment proce-
dure.163 
In what amounts to dicta,164 the appellate court also elaborated 
on the statute’s motion to dismiss mechanism, first noting: “the stat-
ute is silent as to the burden or procedure for considering a motion 
to dismiss.”165 Even so, the court discerned that both burdens and 
procedures adhere to the statute’s framework, as evidenced by its 
purpose.166 Explaining the presence of a burden-shifting frame-
work, the court reasoned that the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss fo-
cuses not on whether a SLAPP filer sufficiently alleges a cause of 
action but rather on whether a SLAPP filer’s cause of action arises 
from the target’s protected activity.167 In other words, the court un-
derstood the law to create a special motion. On that basis, the court 
said the initial burden lies with the SLAPP target to establish that 
 
 162 Id. at 312–13. This, of course, makes sense because the statute grants dis-
cretion to the SLAPP target, providing that such person “may” file a motion for 
summary judgment together with supplementary affidavits. § 768.295(4) (empha-
sis added); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 131, at 112 (noting that per-
missive words such as “may” grant discretion); cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic As-
sociates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2010) (adopting an 
analogous interpretation of Rule 23, which grants discretion to a litigant, not a 
court, to maintain a class action). 
 163 Gundel, 264 So. 3d at 313. 
 164 E.g., Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1253 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009)) (“[D]icta is 
defined as those portions of an opinion that are ‘not necessary to deciding the case 
then before us[.]’”). Because the Gundel court needed only to decide that the trial 
court should have treated the motion as one for summary judgment, its discussion 
of the motion to dismiss mechanism is dicta. See Gundel, 264 So. 3d at 313. 
 165 Id. at 314. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. The court relied in part on the Maine Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Maine’s own anti-SLAPP statute. See id. (citing Schelling v. Lindell, 942 A.2d 
1226, 1229 (Me. 2008)). Yet the Gundel court neglects the fact that Maine’s anti-
SLAPP statute explicitly contains a burden-shifting framework. See ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012) (“The court shall grant the special motion, unless 
the party against whom the special motion is made shows that the moving party’s 
exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or 
any arguable basis in law and that the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to 
the responding party.”(emphasis added)). Florida’s framework, by contrast, con-
tains no such language. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2015). 
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the statute applies—i.e., that the target’s protected activity gives rise 
to the filer’s suit.168 The burden then shifts to the SLAPP filer to 
establish that their claims have merit and do not arise “primarily” 
because of the target’s protected speech.169 On top of that, the court 
asserted that the motion to dismiss entails consideration of matters 
beyond the complaint—here, the supporting affidavit.170 
That reading of the motion to dismiss mechanism defies the stat-
ute’s text, however. For one, the statute explicitly authorizes a 
SLAPP target to file a motion for summary judgment with affida-
vits, while the statute fails to mention supplemental materials in con-
nection with a motion to dismiss.171 To that end, if a court must con-
sider an affidavit when appraising an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss, 
as the Gundel court claims,172 then the language entitling the parties 
to submit “supplemental affidavits” on a summary judgment motion 
is surplusage.173 For another, the Gundel court failed to notice that 
the statute necessarily applies when speech takes one of two forms: 
(1) speech made before a governmental entity about issues under 
review or (2) speech made in connection with the listed forms of 
media.174 In effect, this eclipses the Gundel court’s “initial burden,” 
leaving only the SLAPP filer burdened with establishing that their 
 
 168 Gundel, 264 So. 3d at 314. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 314–15. 
 171 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295(4) (West 2015); see also SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 131, at 93 (“The principle that a matter not covered is not 
covered is so obvious that it seems absurd to recite it.”). 
 172 Interpreting Gundel, one trial court claimed three things to be true: (1) 
plaintiffs faced with an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss have the burden to show 
that their claims are not “without merit,” (2) courts need not accept the com-
plaint’s factual allegations as true or draw all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, 
and (3) courts may look beyond the four corners of the complaint. See Order 
Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Florida’s Anti-Slapp Statute, 
Fla. Stat. § 768.295, Lam v. Univision Commc’ns, Inc., (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 2, 
2019) (No. 2019-016891-CA-01), 2019 WL 6830882, at *2. 
 173 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 131, at 174 (“If possible, every word 
and every provision is to be given effect . . . . None should be ignored. None 
should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another 
provision or to have no consequence.”). 
 174 See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text. 
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claims have merit and do not arise “primarily” because of the tar-
get’s speech.175 
The statute’s text aside, Gundel’s interpretation of the anti-
SLAPP statute contravenes the Florida Constitution’s separation of 
powers provision.176 Not only does the legislative history counsel 
against that construction,177 but it is also a pillar of statutory inter-
pretation that a statute should be construed “in a way that avoids 
placing its constitutionality in doubt.”178 
Above all, the notion that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute contains 
a special motion to dismiss179 defies the statute’s ordinary meaning. 
Indeed, the states’ whose statutes contain special motion procedures 
define them explicitly.180 Against that backdrop, Florida’s Legisla-
ture used language associated with three common motions to in-
struct SLAPP targets that the only thing “special” about those mo-
tions is the fees and costs they might recover if they are success-
ful.181 As Justice Frankfurter put it, “if a word is obviously 
 
 175 See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text. At least one other appel-
late judge has adopted this burden-shifting framework; see WPB Residents for 
Integrity in Gov’t, Inc. v. Materio, 284 So. 3d 555, 561–64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2019) (Gross, J., concurring). But see id. at 564–65 (Forst, J., concurring) (“As 
we have determined that we do not have jurisdiction . . . I do not believe it is ap-
propriate at this juncture to render a view as to the merits of the parties’ legal 
arguments or of the circuit court’s reasoning in denying Petitioners’ motions for 
summary judgment and dismissal.”). In addition, Judge Gross opted to test the 
target’s motion as one for summary judgment, rather than applying the special 
motion-to-dismiss framework announced in Gundel. See id. at 563 (Gross, J., con-
curring) (“Based on the summary judgment evidence, Materio did not meet her 
burden. Her claims are therefore ‘without merit’ under section 768.295(3).”). 
 176 See supra notes 146–150 and accompanying text. 
 177 See supra note 147. 
 178 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 131, at 247–51. 
 179 See Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc., 264 So. 3d 304, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2019) (accepting the argument that an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss “focuses not 
on whether a cause of action has been sufficiently alleged but on whether the ac-
tivity that is alleged to have given rise to the cause of action is protected activ-
ity . . . .”). 
 180 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015) (special motion to 
strike); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-5502 (West 2012) (special motion to dismiss); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2012) (special motion to dismiss); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 1996) (special motion to dismiss). 
 181 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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transplanted from another legal source . . . it brings the old soil with 
it.”182 
With all that said, a federal court tasked with interpreting Florida 
law must predict how the Florida Supreme Court would decide the 
issue.183 Decisions of the Florida District Courts of Appeals “pro-
vide guidance” in that endeavor. 184 Federal courts will disregard 
those decisions, however, “if persuasive evidence demonstrates that 
the [Supreme Court of Florida] would conclude otherwise.”185 The 
rest of this Note will assume that the foregoing evidence is suffi-
ciently persuasive for a federal court to disregard the Gundel court’s 
interpretation of Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute. 
IV. APPLYING THE REA/RDA/ERIE ANALYSIS TO FLORIDA’S 
ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE 
Using that interpretation of Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute, cou-
pled with the predominant approach to putative conflicts between 
Federal Rules of Procedure and states’ anti-SLAPP statutes, this Part 
posits that, unlike most anti-SLAPP statutes, Florida’s version does 
not infringe on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12, or 56.186 As 
 
 182 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. 
L. REV. 527, 537 (1947). 
 183 See, e.g., Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2018) (citations 
omitted). 
 184 Id. (citations omitted). 
 185 Id. See also Knealing v. Puelo, 675 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. 1996) (concluding 
that a statute unconstitutionally “intrudes upon the rule-making authority of the 
Supreme Court” when it “set[] forth only procedural requirements”); Massey v. 
David, 979 So. 2d 931, 935–36 (Fla. 2008) (holding that statute’s “purely proce-
dural nature” “compelled” conclusion that statute unconstitutionally “intrudes 
upon the powers of the judiciary, through the Florida Supreme Court, to determine 
matters of practice and procedure before the Florida courts.”). Similarly, 
“[f]ederal courts are not bound by dicta of state appellate courts.” Kendall v. Plad-
son (In re Pladson), 35 F.3d 462, 466 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); accord 
McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.3d 657, 662 (3d Cir. 1980); United States 
v. Wade, 152 F.3d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1998). And, as already discussed, the Gun-
del court’s discussion of the procedural aspects of Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute is 
dicta. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 186 See supra Section II.B. 
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a result, the Rules of Decision Act guides the choice-of-law analy-
sis.187 This Part analyzes each step in turn. 
A. Florida’s Version Does Not Conflict with Any Federal 
Rules 
A brief discussion of Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56 brings the con-
flicts analysis into focus. Under Rule 8, a complaint must include “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.”188 A defendant can question the sufficiency of 
such a statement by moving to dismiss the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6). To survive such a motion, a complaint must allege suffi-
cient facts to state a facially plausible claim for relief.189 In the same 
way, a defendant can challenge the complaint’s legal basis by mov-
ing for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).190 But, if “mat-
ters . . . are presented to and not excluded by the court” on either 
motion, then “the motion must be treated as one for summary judg-
ment under Rule 56.”191 And summary judgment is proper only 
when no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.192 In sum, these Rules provide a comprehensive framework 
governing pretrial dismissal and judgment.193 
Most states’ iterations of the anti-SLAPP statute disturb that 
framework by raising the bar for a filer to overcome a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),194 or for summary judgment under 
 
 187 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 188 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 189 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). 
 190 See 5C CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1367 (3d ed. 2020) (“The motion for a judgment on the plead-
ings only has utility when all material allegations of fact are admitted or not con-
troverted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain to be decided by the 
district court.”). 
 191 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
 192 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 56(a). 
 193 Carbone v. Cable News Network, 910 F.3d 1345, 1351 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 194 See id. at 1356 (holding that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute conflicts with 
Rule 12(b)(6) because it requires the “plaintiff to establish ‘a probability’ that he 
‘will prevail on the claim’ asserted in the complaint”); La Liberte v. Reid, 966 
F.3d 79, 87 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that California’s anti-SLAPP statute conflicts 
with Rule 12(b)(6) because it requires “dismissal unless the plaintiff can 
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Rule 56,195 and by creating a separate device to test a claim’s valid-
ity.196 Not so for Florida’s statute. Instead, it instructs SLAPP tar-
gets to test the validity of a filer’s claim by using preexisting proce-
dural devices.197 Indeed, any other interpretation would cast doubt 
on the statute’s constitutionality under the Florida Constitution’s 
separation of powers provision.198 
As a result, Rules 8, 12, and 56 have the requisite space to oper-
ate. Once a target appeals to the procedures outlined by those rules, 
a court can test the filer’s claim as it would on an ordinary motion. 
When a court finds that a given claim is in fact meritless, the stat-
ute’s fee-shifting provision applies if the claim arises from the tar-
get’s protected speech.199 In this sense, Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute 
fuses with Rules 8, 12, and 56, deferring to those devices for the 
relevant procedures, while adding a substantive element—the type 
of activity giving rise to the filer’s claim—for claims that fall within 
the statute’s ambit.200 In sum, the statute neither raises the bar for a 
 
‘establish[] a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim’”); Klocke v. 
Watson, 936 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that Texas’s anti-SLAPP stat-
ute conflicts with Rule 12(b)(6) because it requires “‘clear and specific evidence’ 
that a plaintiff can meet each element of his claim”); Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., 
LLC., 783 F.3d 1328, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that D.C.’s anti-SLAPP 
statute conflicts with Rule 12(b)(6) because it requires dismissal when the “plain-
tiff does not have a likelihood of success on the merits”). 
 195 Compare Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1350–51 (internal citations omitted) (hold-
ing that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute conflicts with Rule 56 because it “contem-
plates a substantive, evidentiary determination of the plaintiff’s probability of pre-
vailing on his claims.”), with Block v. Tanenhaus, 815 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 
2016) (assuming that Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute does not conflict with Rule 
56 because it provides the same standard for summary judgment as Rule 56). 
 196 Carbone, 910 F.3d at 1351 (“In other words, the [Federal] Rules contem-
plate that a claim will be assessed on the pleadings alone or under the summary 
judgment standard; there is no room for any other device for determining whether 
a valid claim supported by sufficient evidence to avoid pretrial dismissal.”). 
 197 See supra Section III.A.2. 
 198 See supra notes 176–178 and accompanying text. 
 199 See supra Section III.A.1. 
 200 See Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 
2016) (suggesting that Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute “fuses with Rules 8, 12, and 
56 by entitling the prevailing party to fees and costs if, after invoking the devices 
set forth by those rules, a court finds an action is ‘without merit’ and thus prohib-
ited.”). As Bongino shows, the questions of whether a target’s speech is protected, 
and whether that speech is the primary cause of the filer’s suit, require minimal 
analysis. See id. (citing Parekh v. CBS Corp., 820 F. App’x 827, 831–32 (11th 
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filer to overcome a motion for pretrial disposition nor creates a sep-
arate device to test the validity of a filer’s claim. Therefore, the stat-
ute leaves intact the comprehensive framework set forth by Rules 8, 
12, and 56, avoiding conflict with those Rules altogether. 
B. Applying Florida’s Statute in Federal Courts Serves 
Erie’s Twin Aims 
When there is no conflict between the relevant state law and the 
Federal Rules, the Rules of Decision Act governs the choice-of-law 
analysis.201 And that choice turns on the twin aims underlying Erie: 
avoiding the unfairness that arises when litigation differs because it 
is brought in federal court and deterring the correlative forum-shop-
ping.202 Applying Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute carries out both of 
these goals. As for the first aim, applying the statute avoids unfair-
ness that would result if a SLAPP target could recover attorney’s 
fees in a Florida court but not in a federal court. With no ability to 
recoup attorney’s fees and costs, a target might submit to a SLAPP 
altogether,203 leading to the chilling effect that anti-SLAPP statutes 
aim to wipe out.204 
To that end, applying the statute in federal court eliminates any 
incentive for SLAPP filers to prefer federal rather than state court. 
Because a SLAPP filer’s purpose is to punish or silence the target,205 
there is a double incentive to file in whichever forum does not have 
an anti-SLAPP statute. For example, if Florida’s statute does not ap-
ply in federal court, not only can a SLAPP filer evade the risk of 
having to pay the target’s attorney’s fees and costs, but the SLAPP 
filer can also better accomplish their purpose—to punish and silence 
 
Cir. 2020) (“[B]ecause [p]laintiff’s suit ‘arose out of’ [d]efendant’s news report, 
the second element—free speech in connection with a public issue —is also sat-
isfied.”). 
 201 See supra pp. 7–13. 
 202 Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965) (“The ‘outcome-deter-
mination’ test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the 
Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable ad-
ministration of the laws.”). 
 203 See supra note 17. 
 204 See Memorandum from Shetterly, supra note 8, at 2–3. 
 205 See Pring & Canan, supra note 1, at 939. 
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the target206—because the target can no longer recover fees and 
costs to fund their defense. 
On the other hand, the presence of countervailing federal inter-
ests at times counsels against applying a state’s law, even when do-
ing so would serve Erie’s twin aims.207 The argument might state 
that federal courts have no business applying “exotic” state proce-
dural rules. 208 But Florida’s statute does not require that of federal 
courts.209 In fact, the opposite is true: federal courts often apply state 
laws that contain fee-shifting elements.210 For all of these reasons, 
Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute should apply in Federal Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Even under an expansive reading of the Federal Rules, there is 
no conflict between the Rules and Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute. 
Florida’s anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision—which attaches to 
claims that arise primarily because a target spoke (a) before a gov-
ernment entity about matters under review or (b) in connection with 
an assortment of multimedia—steps back and leaves the procedure 
to state and federal devices. In this way, the statute is simply a fee-
shifting law for an important constitutional right. Using the interpre-
tive arguments outlined by this Note, practitioners should trigger 
Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute more often. Indeed, lawyers can use 
this tool for pro-bono and corporate media defendants alike and, in 
doing so, defend the right to engage in robust debate on public issues 
for all Floridians no matter their financial means. After all, that is 
the statute’s stated intent.211 
 
 206 See Memorandum from Shetterly, supra note 8, at 1–2. 
 207 See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 208 See Makeaff v. Trump Univ., LLC 715 F.3d 254, 275 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“Federal courts have no business applying exotic state 
procedural rules which, of necessity, disrupt the comprehensive scheme embodied 
in the Federal Rules . . . .”). 
 209 See supra Section III. 
 210 See Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1323–24 (S.D. Fla. 
2020) (“decades of Eleventh Circuit precedent . . . find that state-law statutes and 
claims for attorneys’ fees and costs ‘unequivocally’ apply in a federal court exer-
cising diversity jurisdiction.”). 
 211 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295(1) (West 2015). 
